While Mozambique has a better LGBTQ+ track record than some in the region, tolerance that doesn’t eliminate exclusion Originally published on Global Voices Photo taken by LGBTQIA+ activists. Maputo, Mozambique: 2024. Used with permission. In Mozambique , the lack of laws criminalizing LGBTQ+ identities is often taken as a sign of tolerance. However, for many transgender people and LBQ (lesbian, bisexual, and queer) women, their everyday reality tells a different story. In schools, health facilities, workplaces, religious spaces, and on digital platforms, discrimination continues to affect access to rights, opportunities, and social participation. Although legal persecution is less obvious than in some countries in the region, such as Nigeria , activists say exclusion often works through silence, invisibility, and institutional neglect. “As nobody writes about us, we become invisible,” said Pepetsa Fumo, a Trans activist with Transform , an organization working for the recognition and inclusion of trans people in Mozambique . Schools as spaces of exclusion For many activists, exclusion begins in the education system, where school curricula are profoundly heteronormative, leaving little room for discussions about sexual orientation, gender identity, or diversity. One example of this institutional resistance to inclusion is that officials have withdrawn any references to sexual orientation from Mozambiquan school materials . According to activists, this environment contributes to bullying, psychological violence, and a high dropout rate among LGBTQ+ students. Many teachers receive little or no training on diversity, human rights, and inclusion, limiting their ability to create safe learning environments, as Pepetsa noted in an interview with GV. “The challenge begins in the ministry itself, and in the way teachers are trained to not respect diversity.” These educational inequalities often continue into adulthood, affecting employment opportunities, economic security, and social mobility. Economic survival beyond recognition Economic vulnerability has become one of LGBTQ+ activists’ most persistent worries. Many Trans people and LBQ women face difficulties in accessing formal employment, professional training, and alternative income-generating opportunities. While various community initiatives aim to support people economically, they face significant structural barriers, including limited funding, a lack of management training, and dependence on external support. “Today you have work, tomorrow it’s over. Then you’re back to taking a break in the shade again,” Pepetsa observed. Organizations such as Por Ela (By Her) try to address these challenges by prioritizing LBQ women-led businesses and promoting community leadership and entrepreneurship initiatives. But for activists, economic empowerment cannot be separated from wider struggles for dignity, recognition, and citizenship. Health and the limits of visibility Healthcare is another area where both advances and exclusion coexist. Years of campaigning have developed for greater recognition of Trans communities in response to HIV and AIDS , but still, activists often question the language used in public policy. “I am not a ‘key population.’ I'm Darius. Don’t confuse me with this category,” said one interviewee in an interview with GV. Although trans people have gained greater visibility within some institutions, LBQ women remain largely absent from debates and health programs. Many health professionals are trained in analyzing LGBT key populations and communities, but they rarely receive training about the specific needs of LBQ women. According to activists, this invisibility has real consequences. Cases of violence against lesbian women, for example, are often recorded only as gender-based violence, without considering if their sexual orientation motivated the attack. Digital spaces: Between empowerment and vulnerability For many LGBTQ+ communities in Mozambique, digital platforms have become essential tools for organizing, mobilizing, and raising awareness. Social media allows queer communities to share experiences, publicly document respect for rights in practice, build networks of solidarity, and amplify community voices. However, the same spaces also expose activists and human rights defenders to online harassment, surveillance, and violence . Queer activists, t rans people, and women human rights defenders recount experiences of hate speech, intimidation, disinformation campaigns, and public exposure that reproduce wider patterns of social exclusion. These issues are arising at a time when debates on digital governance and cybersecurity are becoming more prominent in Mozambique. While officially politicians focus on technological development and digital security, activists argue that the discussion should also include freedom of expression, privacy, and civic participation. Beyond the paradox The experiences of t rans people and LBQ women in Mozambique demonstrate that exclusion is rarely limited to only one sphere of social life. Educational barriers, economic precariousness, inequalities in access to healthcare, and digital violence reinforce each other, creating cycles of vulnerability that go far beyond identity issues. For activists, this is above all a discussion about citizenship, participation, and democratic inclusion. Recognition is important, but it is not enough. Real inclusion requires access to rights, economic opportunities, security, and representation — in both financial spaces and in digital environments. In a global context characterized by the advance of anti-rights movements and the expansion of digital surveillance, the experiences of LGBTQ+ communities in Mozambique highlight the importance of bringing debates on gender, diversity, and digital justice closer to the lived realities of communities in the Global South . Written (Português) by Tirso Sitoe Translated (English) by Liam Anderson View original post (Português)

In the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), an armed group known as the M23 imposes its authority on local communities. But what is the history behind this movement?

Instability in North Kivu, DRC, has significant impacts on the country’s political future Originally published on Global Voices M23 rebels during the Kibumba withdrawal. Screenshot the video “M23 Rebels Withdraw from Kibumba” on the TV5Monde YouTube Channel. Editor’s note: Since Jean Sovon first published this article on November 24, 2023, incumbent President Félix Tshisekedi was re-elected with 73 percent of the vote in the December 20, 2023 elections. The conflict has also worsened. In early 2025, M23 rebels launched new offensives, taking complete control of Goma and Bukavu, the capitals of North and South Kivu, pushing the number of internally displaced persons above 7 million. In the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), an armed group known as the March 23 Movement (M23) imposes its authority on local communities through violence, sexual assault , and terror. But what is the history behind this movement? And what impact did its offensives have on the December 2023 general elections? What is the M23? The M23 emerged from renewed tensions following the Kivu Conflict . This localized conflict in the eastern DRC, along the border with Rwanda, began in 2004. The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) faced opposition from several armed groups. These groups included the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), founded in 2006 by the politician and Tutsi militia leader Laurent Nkunda. The DRC is a multi-ethnic country , and the Tutsis are an ethnic group primarily living in the Kivu region. After five years of conflict, the DR Congolese state and the CNDP signed a peace agreement on March 23, 2009. Under the agreement, the rebel group agreed to transform into a political party in exchange for the release of its imprisoned members, improved living conditions for Tutsi communities, and three ministerial posts in government after the 2011 presidential election . The DRC authorities’ failure to comply with the agreement terms led former CNDP rebels, who had integrated into the national Congolese army under the peace agreement, to revolt. In April 2012, they consequently formed the M23 to mark the agreement signing date, March 23, 2009 . This TV5Monde report explains the origins of this movement: The rebel movement thereby resumed its armed campaign. According to officials in Kinshasa, the DRC capital, both Rwanda and Uganda supported the M23. Both countries, however, denied any involvement. An anonymous DR Congolese officer, who was involved in the 2013 conflict, explained further in this article by online media outlet Afrique XXI : Kigali niait, mais nous,au front, il nous arrivait de capturer des combattants rwandais ou des soldats du M23 qui étaient passés par le Rwanda, explique, sous le couvert de l’anonymat, un gradé congolais ayant pris part au conflit en 2013. Le message, c’était d’anéantir le M23, point! Il ne s’agissait absolument pas de mener la guerre jusqu’au Rwanda, même si, avec les informations qu’on avait, on savait parfaitement d’où et de qui venait cette guerre. Le Rwanda est dirigé par des Tutsi, le M23 est une mutinerie de soldats congolais tutsi, ils sont frères et parlent la même langue, ils avaient même souvent des liens familiaux au Rwanda. Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, denied everything, but on the frontline, we would often capture Rwandan fighters or M23 soldiers who had passed through Rwanda. Our orders were to wipe out the M23, period! Although we knew perfectly well who was behind this war and where it came from, based on the information we had, taking the war to Rwanda was never our intention. Tutsis lead Rwanda, and the M23 is a mutiny of Congolese Tutsi soldiers. They are brothers who speak the same language and often have family connections in Rwanda. Four years after signing the peace agreement, the M23 rebellion appeared to end. Backed by UN peacekeepers, on November 5, 2013, the FARDC won a historic victory against M23 troops. Silenced, they fled to neighboring countries, such as Uganda and Rwanda . This video provides a detailed overview of the FARDC victory: M23 makes a comeback However, in March 2022, almost a decade after its defeat, the M23 made a military comeback. According to UN experts , with Rwanda’s ongoing support, the movement took up arms once again in the region, launching offensives against the DR Congolese army’s strategic positions. The motivation behind this resurgence remained unchanged: The DRC authorities’ failure to comply with the 2009 peace agreement. On March 25, 2022, Bertrand Bisimwa , the current M23 leader, explained his desire to avoid another war on X: Nous avons tout fait pour éviter une nouvelle guerre dans ce pays. Cependant le gouvernement congolais a fait ses choix. pic.twitter.com/LoKwZYSaPM — Bertrand Bisimwa (@bbisimwa) March 25, 2022 We have done everything to avoid another war in this country. However, the DR Congolese government has made its choices. pic.twitter.com/LoKwZYSaPM — Bertrand Bisimwa (@bbisimwa) March 25, 2022 The text in the picture reads: The violence currently inflicted upon us by the Congolese army (FARDC) in the Rutshuru territory is a deliberate choice by the government. The state has chosen to wage war against citizens who surrendered unconditionally. We did this in response to the President’s appeal at the start of his term [DRC President Félix Tshisekedi’s January 2019 inaguration address], calling on the country’s sons and daughters to unite and rebuild the nation. In response, our organization sent several letters to the President of the Republic and the Coordinator of the National Monitoring Mechanism of the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement (MNS). In these documents, we offered our unconditional surrender and put ourselves at the Head of State’s service. Subsequently, on our own initiative, we sent delegates to Kinshasa to speed up this surrender. Copies of these letters are attached to this press release: Letter from January 26, 2019: Sent to the President, congratulating him on taking office. Our movement offered its full support, backing his national reconciliation program and helping bring peace to eastern DRC. Explanatory Note from March 9, 2019: Sent to the President regarding the peace process stemming from the Nairobi Declarations of December 12, 2013. Letter from June 15, 2019: Sent to the newly appointed Coordinator of the National Monitoring Mechanism of the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement (MNS), Mr. Claude Ibalanky Ekolomba, requesting updates on the 2013 peace declarations signed between the DRC government and the M23. Letter from July 12, 2019: Sent to the Coordinator of the National Monitoring Mechanism of the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement (MNS), expressing our full support for the 2017 Brazzaville regional agreement, specifically regarding plans to return M23 fighters home unconditionally. Letter from September 21, 2020: Sent to the President to once again confirm ou surrender and verify that all M23 political and military personnel were following his orders. Mission Order from September 30, 2020: After receiving no response to our letters, our movement sent a delegation to Kinshasa to speed up the surrender process. Our delegates remained in Kinshasa for 14 months. They held multiple working sessions with state authorities, who eventually told them to return to their base and wait for the surrender operations to begin. Much to our surprise, just two weeks later, the FARDC launched an offensive, putting our fighters on the defensive. Official Record from October 24, 2020: Documenting the formal recognition of the General Staff of the Congolese Revolutionary Army. Letter from February 12, 2021: Following the Kinshasa meetings, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, Mr. Gilbert Kankonde, wrote to the President, informing him of a complete M23 stand-down. He requested funds to execute the disarmament operation, but to no avail. The military operations that the national army has launched against our fighters clearly show that the government has chosen to fight the M23 rather than accept our unconditional surrender. Our organization has been tirelessly awaiting the implementation of the peace process for nine years. We deeply deplore this choice of violence, whose hidden objective is to maintain instability and underdevelopment in eastern DRC. Signed in Sarambwe on March 25, 2022 By the March 23 Movement Willy NGOMA Spokesperson for the Congolese Revolutionary Army Interviewed by TV5Monde in April 2022, Pierre Boisselet , Violence Research Director at Ebuteli, a Congolese research institute , elaborated further on the M23 comeback: Far from weakened, the M23 gained territory and expanded its influence in North Kivu a year after the renewed hostilities. This was a major setback for the Kinshasa government, which sought to regain and secure these territories ahead of the upcoming general elections. Instability risks during elections In late December 2023, as the DRC prepared to hold its general elections, the electoral roll revision process went smoothly throughout the country. However, voter enrollment was extremely challenging in the east, prompting some political figures and civil society organizations to request an extension in these areas. Read more: General election preparations continue despite growing insecurity in DRC. During the electoral process, the M23 comeback had a major impact, including increasing insecurity in the province with the second-largest voter count. Forced to flee, the number of internally displaced persons continues to increase in the DRC. Quoted in a TV5Monde article on November 19, 2023, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported: La reprise des combats début octobre a déjà fait plus de 450 000 déplacés supplémentaire. Les provinces du Nord-Kivu, du Sud-Kivu et de l’Ituri abritent à elles seules plus de 5,5 millions de personnes déplacées. The renewed hostilities, beginning in October, have already displaced an additional 450,000 people. The North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri provinces alone host more than 5.5 million displaced persons. In addition to the M23, other rebel groups also operate in the same region. These include the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a predominantly Muslim group affiliated with the Islamic State, which often attacks civilians. Another is the Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO), a group committed to protecting the Lendu community from the Hema ethnic group and FARDC in the northeastern Ituri Province . Lastly is the rebel branch of the Burundian National Forces of Liberation (FNL), based in the Mwenga Territory , South Kivu Province . These groups, therefore, pose a security challenge for the Kinshasa government, which has yet to find a solution to the M23 rebellion. The general elections on December 20, 2023, were ultimately held amid high tensions and escalating violence throughout the region. According to Bob Kabamba, Professor of Political Sciences at the University of Liège, the risk of spillover effects was not limited to the DRC’s borders . In a TV5Monde interview, he warned: Il faut souligner l’inquiétude de toute la région : l’est de la RDC, l’Afrique centrale, la Communauté de développement d'Afrique australe… tous tirent la sonnette d’alarme sur la situation au Congo, sur la persistance d’une insécurité qui pourrait impacter d’autres pays comme le Congo Brazzaville, la République centrafricaine et le Sud Soudan si le Congo se trouvait déstabilisé. We must highlight the concerns felt across the region. For eastern DRC, Central Africa, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), alarm bells are ringing about the situation in the Congo and its ongoing insecurity. If the Congo were to become destabilized, this could ultimately impact other countries, such as Congo-Brazzaville, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan. Written (Français) by Jean Sovon Translated (English) by Laura View original post (Français)

Most rape victims stay silent Originally published on Global Voices Image of a woman displaced by war at the Don Bosco camp in Nyiragongo in North Kivu, eastern DRC. Photo by Katembo Mbuto Victoire. Used with permission. This article by Katembo Mbuto Victoire was originally published on Icicongo on December 12, 2024. It has been republished on Global Voices as part of a content partnership agreement. Since the 1990s, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been rocked by continuous armed conflicts stemming from various factors, including internal tensions, regional instability, and a legacy of colonialism. Today, more than 100 active armed groups operate in this country. The conflict currently marring eastern DRC first began in 2012. Rebels from the March 23 Movement (M23) took up arms in the North Kivu Province, claiming that the central DRC government had failed to honor the 2009 peace agreement it had signed with the M23 predecessor, the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP). Read more: Who are the M23 rebels in eastern DRC? In areas gripped by armed conflict, sexual violence against women is prevalent. However, the perpetrators are not only soldiers or armed rebels. Civilians also take this opportunity to abuse and rape women seeking domestic work in their homes. This is precisely what happened to Charline, a young woman in her twenties. Staring blankly ahead as tears streamed down her face, her sadness was evident. She recalled: C’était un mercredi. Pendant que je faisais le tour des parcelles à la recherche de l’emploi, une maman m’avait demandé de lessiver les habits de ses enfants pour me payer 5000 franc congolais, puis elle est partie au bouloPendant que je lessivais, un de ses fils, un peu costaud, m’avait appelée dans la maison. Je croyais que c’était pour me donner d’autres habits à laver. Quand suis entrée, comme on était seulement deux dans la parcelle, il m’a plaqué sur le sol et m’a violé. J’avais peur de le dire à sa mère. Les images de cette scène me reviennent souvent. It was a Wednesday. As I went around the neighborhoods looking for work, a mother asked me to wash her children’s clothes for 5,000 Congolese francs (USD 2.19), and then she left for work. As I washed, one of her sons, who was a bit stocky, called me into the house. I presumed it was to give me more clothes to wash. However, when I went inside, as we were the only two people on the property, he pinned me down on the floor and raped me. I was scared to tell his mother. Images of this incident frequently come to mind. Like Charline, many women displaced by war also fall victim to sexual violence when looking for odd jobs to support their families. They are easy targets for predators who exploit their vulnerability. A mother of two, interviewed at the Don Bosco refugee camp in Ngangi , DRC, explains: Nous vivons la misère au camp. On n’arrive pas à survivre. Chaque jour, je me réveille pour aller en ville afin de chercher où travailler. Mais certains profitent de ce temps pour abuser de nous. Nous avons du mal à dénoncer vu que nous cherchons les moyens pour nourrir nos familles et répondre à nos besoins vitaux. At the camp, we live in squalor and struggle to survive. Every morning, I set off into town, looking for work. However, some men take advantage of this to abuse us. As we are constantly looking for the means to feed our families and meet our basic needs, we find it difficult to report these incidents. According to Semu Sikulimwenge, Clinical Psychologist at the HEAL Africa Hospital in Goma, the capital of the North Kivu Province, DRC, sexual violence reinforces skewed power dynamics between survivors and perpetrators. He explains: Il est essentiel de développer des moyens de subsistance, notamment par des activités génératrices de revenus, afin de favoriser l’autonomie économique des victimes et de renforcer la résilience des communautés affectées. Developing means of survival, especially through income-generating activities, is essential for fostering the victims’ economic independence and the affected communities’ resilience. Fear of reprisals In response to the rising tide of rape cases involving displaced persons, Attorney Patrick Musambali stresses that such acts of sexual violence are gross violations of Article 170 of the Congolese Penal Code . This article stipulates: Est puni d'une servitude pénale de cinq à vingt ans celui qui aura commis un viol, soit à l'aide de violences ou menaces graves, soit par ruse, soit en abusant d'une personne qui, par l'effet d'une maladie, par l'altération de ses facultés ou par toute autre cause accidentelle, aurait perdu l'usage de ses sens ou en aurait été privée par quelque artifice. A person who commits rape, either through serious violence, threats, deception, or by abusing a person who, as a result of an illness, impaired faculties, or any other accidental cause, has lost the use of their senses or had them stripped by deceptive means, shall be punished with 5 to 20 years of penal servitude . Most rape victims fail to report their abuse out of fear of reprisal from the perpetrators. However, through awareness-raising campaigns, some now want to see their perpetrators behind bars. Eugénie Wimana, a leader at the Don Bosco displaced persons camp, stated: Nous sensibilisons des femmes et des jeunes filles d’avoir une conscience collective pour arriver à lutter contre les violences sexuelles. Grâce aux soutiens de quelques organisations humanitaires, certains déplacés entreprennent des petites activités génératrices de revenus. We raise collective awareness among women and young girls to effectively combat sexual violence. With the support of humanitarian organizations, some displaced persons have begun small-scale income-generating activities. What’s more, Sikulimwenge highlighted: Le soutien psychosocial est crucial pour créer un espace sécurisé où les victimes peuvent exprimer leurs émotions Psychosocial support is vital for creating a safe space where victims can express their feelings. The women’s rights organization Women Power also offers its assistance. As part of its “Emergency Response to Gender-Based Violence and Sexual and Reproductive Health” project, the NGO raises awareness about respect for human dignity and advocates to ensure the perpetrators are punished by law. Small businesses for survival According to Aurélie Maliro, Women Power Communications Assistant, around 70 percent of women from the Kashaka Shabindu refugee camp in northern Goma are at risk of various forms of violence. This results in unwanted pregnancies, unsafe abortions, and sexually transmitted infections (STIs). Nous intervenons dans la prise en charge psycho médicale pour apporter de l’espoir aux victimes. Nous demandons à notre gouvernement de soutenir ces femmes victimes de violences sexuelles car leurs vies socioéconomiques chutent après ces abus. We provide psychological and medical care, offering the victims hope. As their socioeconomic lives collapse around them following this abuse, we call on our government to support female victims of sexual violence. Some displaced persons set up small businesses to survive. Photo by Victoire Katembo Mbuto. Used with permission To avoid sexual abuse, some displaced women, who are also survivors of sexual violence, rape, and other types of violence, gradually start small businesses. One displaced woman from the Don Bosco camp anonymously explained: Je fais le commerce. Je prends de produits vivriers chez une vendeuse qui vit aux alentours du camp pour les revendre ici. De cette manière je gagne mon pain et je subviens à d’autres besoins. I run a small business. I buy food products from a vendor who lives near the camp to resell here. This way, I can make a living and meet other needs. To see lasting change, officials and advocates must foster an environment where survivors can speak out and report their abusers. If these perpetrators go unpunished, they will only continue to commit these heinous crimes. Read more: IciCongo: Portrait of a young online channel that wants to “Tell the story of Congo differently” Written (Français) by IciCongo Translated (English) by Laura View original post (Français)