A statistic alone does not change society Originally published on Global Voices Silivri Prison in Turkey. Image from Wikimedia Commons . CC BY-SA 4.0 . This article was produced by Ahmet Kavruk from the group Gündem Hapishane in Türkiye through the Digital Spark granting scheme, as part of the Regional Support Mechanism EECA project. It was implemented by the Metamorphosis Foundation and TechSoup , in partnership with CIVICUS and under the Digital Democracy Initiative (DDI) that covers the Global South. It is being published on Global Voices as part of a content-sharing agreement. In late 2025, prisons in Türkiye became more visible than they had been in a long time. The 11th Judicial Package , a legislative reform that became law in December, was debated for days on television, in newspapers, and on social media. Sentencing regulations, claims of early release, and changes to the penal system were at the forefront of public discourse. However, as the debates intensified , another issue came to light: Many people discussing the same topic did not actually have the same information. Having worked in human rights and journalism for over a decade, I repeatedly heard similar questions from those around me during this process. There was significant confusion about who the legislation would cover, what changes it would bring about, and whether it would solve the fundamental problems in prisons. But I noticed something during this debate: prisons are only discussed when a new sentencing regulation is on the agenda, and the debates mostly revolve around well-known individuals or high-profile political cases. Meanwhile, the vast majority of this closed industry, which houses hundreds of thousands of people, remains invisible. That’s where the idea for our Substack newsletter Prison Agenda (Gündem Hapishane) came from. I wanted to create an independent publication that would contribute to discussions about prisons and prisoners’ human rights, not just in times of crisis but from a human rights perspective based on reliable, up-to-date information. I shared this idea with my colleague Tutku Sönmez , and since we both recognized the need, we decided to take action together. Turning numbers into human stories A prison in Sinop, Turkey. Image from Wikimedia Commons . CC BY 2.0 . On January 1, 2026, Tutku and I launched the Prison Agenda. Rather than producing new news, our goal was to translate information that was already publicly available but scattered, technical, and difficult to access into a language that everyone could understand. Every month, we review official statistics, parliamentary commission minutes, Council of Europe reports, EuroPris data, and academic research. We then simplify, verify, and convert these into infographics, data visualizations, and short analyses using digital design tools. We sometimes refer to this process as “rights-based translation,” as our focus is on making existing information visible and accessible rather than generating new knowledge. The unseen ‘high needs’ prisoners Türkiye currently has the largest prison population in Europe, with the number of prisoners more than doubling over the last decade. However, this figure is often presented as nothing more than a cold statistic. Our aim is to remind people that a human being stands behind every number. Take, for example, young children living in prison with their mothers, foreign nationals who cannot access justice mechanisms because they do not speak Turkish, women who cannot benefit from educational and social activities because of staff shortages, and elderly and disabled prisoners who struggle to access healthcare. These groups often do not even make it into the footnotes of official reports. Yet, from a human rights perspective, these are precisely the individuals who should be the most visible. In every piece of content we produce, we strive to reduce this invisibility, even if only slightly, by referencing international standards such as the Bangkok Rules and the Mandela Rules , which establish international baselines for prison standards and the treatment of inmates. A greater impact When we launched the project, our main goal was to create a reliable and sustainable source of information, rather than to reach a large audience. We weren’t sure how the public would respond to regular publications on prisons, a topic which typically receives limited public attention. However, the rapid growth of our subscriber base within a short time showed us that the need was far greater than we had expected. In the first six months, we have received 435 subscribers for our Turkish and English newsletters. Our newsletters began to serve as an important reference source for journalists, human rights advocates, academics and civil society workers. Over time, we have diversified our work, beginning to produce three regular publications: The News Bulletin, which summarises key developments; the Data Bulletin , which analyzes official statistics to highlight trends; and the Parliamentary Monitoring Bulletin , through which we closely track prison-related legislative activities in the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye . We also publish thematic articles focusing on vulnerable groups to mark important dates such as Pride Month, World Refugee Day, International Women’s Day and the Day of Solidarity with Victims of Torture. The challenges and future of independent publishing Needless to say, working in this field is not easy. Prisons are, by their very nature, closed-off institutions that are difficult to oversee. Access to information is limited, official data is fragmented, and bureaucratic processes are slow. Furthermore, addressing these sensitive issues in a political climate where civil society is under pressure involves managing the risk of encountering legal or technical obstacles at any time. Securing financial resources to sustain independent journalism is another challenge. Despite this, Prison Agenda taught me something important about journalism. I used to think that the fundamental role of journalism was to produce information. Today, however, I believe there is another responsibility that is just as important: Transforming complex information into information that people can actually use. Because a statistic alone does not change society. But when we can see the human stories behind that statistic, we can begin to talk about human rights violations and solutions. In the coming period, as we strengthen our Turkish-language publications, we also intend to develop our English-language newsletter further, in order to more effectively connect civil society initiatives in Türkiye with international human rights networks. No matter how physically distant prisons may be from society, the rights of those living inside them are universal. We believe that access to information is a fundamental right, not a privilege. Written by GV Central Asia and Caucasus

‘We cannot allow our young people to become victims of an unjust war of aggression.’ Originally published on Global Voices Representatives from Korean civil society marched from the U.S. Embassy to the Blue House (the executive office and residence of the president of South Korea) in Seoul. Image provided by People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy in its press release . Used with permission. This post is part of Global Voices’ September 2026 Spotlight series, “ Protest in Democracy .” With this Spotlight, we seek to explore the many forms of protest, the tactics states use to delegitimize and suppress them, and the complex relationship between protest and democracy. You can support this coverage by donating here . Upon Seoul confirming its plan to make a “substantive contribution,” including combat or non-combat military deployment options, to the Strait of Hormuz last week, a coalition of 601 civic groups gathered outside the U.S. Embassy on September 9, 2026, and marched towards the presidential office. The protesters were signaling their opposition to South Korea’s involvement in the Middle East conflict, arguing that the decision would undermine the country’s constitution and sovereignty. Since the United States and Israel launched their joint military action against Iran in early 2026, leading to Iran’s blockade of the Straight of Hormuz, U.S. President Donald Trump has been pressuring allies in Europe and Asia to help reopen the Strait by providing military support. As the U.S.’s November 2026 midterm elections approach, pressure to rally international support for this unpopular war is mounting, and Trump has started squeezing his allies harder . Weeks ahead of the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral military drill , Trump wrote on his Truth Social account that he is scaling down U.S. involvement in the exercise due to Seoul’s reluctance to engage in the Middle East conflict. Washington also announced in early September that it would enact a “targeted, thoughtful tariff policy” on semiconductor imports , clearly targeting Seoul, as South Korea is a major hub for the global semiconductor industry. Soon after this announcement , South Korean domestic media outlets quoted a presidential office official saying Seoul was set to deploy troops to Hormuz by late 2026. While President Lee Jae-myung stressed that the plan was still under review and no final decision had been made , the Ministry of National Defense dispatched a field investigation team to assess the situation in Hormuz on September 7. An imperialist war Since President Lee Jae-myung’s announcement on September 4, Korean civil society has released an outpouring of statements and launched numerous protests. On that day, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions issued a statement warning against any form of military deployment, arguing that if Korea were coerced into joining the “imperialist war,” it would risk the safety of Korean people and the country’s sovereignty. The Trade Unions also criticized the U.S. for trying to leverage semiconductor tariff negotiations to bargain for military backup, suggesting it was underhanded and unethical. Lee Mu-jin, Executive Committee Chair of the Seoul Candlelight Action, the civic coalition which successfully mobilized for former president Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment, also spoke out against the U.S. economic coercion in a public gathering on September 5th, urging officials to defend the country’s sovereignty by rejecting Trump’s demands. Many politicians and political parties issued similarly strong statements against the U.S.’s attempt to drag Seoul into the war with Iran. Both the Green Party and the Justice Party described Trump as a “warmonger,” with the latter raising the following question in a statement on X: 미국 내에서조차 트럼프의 소수 측근만이 옹호하는 이 군사작전에 왜 한국의 시민들이, 청년들이 방패막이가 되어야 하는가. 호르무즈 파병동의안은 “전쟁광 호위동의안”이다. Why should South Korean citizens and young people be used as a human shield for this military operation, while within the U.S. only a handful of Trump’s closest aides support the war? The plan to approve the dispatch of troops to the Strait of Hormuz will serve as a ‘consensus to stand by a warmonger.’ Small-scale protests were seen throughout the weekend. On September 5, People in Solidarity with Palestinians, a civic group composed of students and humanitarian workers, organized an emergency rally against the potential military deployment. “한국군 호르무즈 파병 반대한다!” “이재명 정부는 호르무즈에 한국군 파병 말라!” “No War! No Troops!” https://t.co/3AR1kVUKa2 pic.twitter.com/XmMTTqH5Ev — 팔레스타인인들과 연대하는 사람들(팔연사) (@ppl4pal_kr) September 5, 2026 “We Oppose the Deployment of Korean Troops to Hormuz!” “The Lee Jae-myung Government Must Not Deploy Korean Troops to Hormuz!” “No War! No Troops!” Numerous protests and peace actions took place on university campuses and downtown Seoul on September 7. Meanwhile, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei wrote in Korean on X, suggesting that South Korea’s military presence in Hormuz would result in “serious consequences,” accompanied by an image reading “dangerous choices come with a price.” On September 9, a coalition of 601 civic groups, the Joint Action Against War of Aggression and Troop Deployment, organized a joint action condemning the U.S. diplomatic coercion. In a statement, the coalition described the U.S. and Israel’s attack on Iran as “an unlawful war of aggression” that violates international law and argued that military deployment to the Middle East will violate the South Korean Constitution, as, according to Article 5, the country should “renounce aggressive war.” The coalition stressed: 우리의 청년들을 부당한 침략전쟁의 희생양으로 내어줄 수는 없다. We cannot allow our young people to sacrifice and become victims of an unjust war of aggression. After stating their positions in front of the U.S. embassy, representatives from the civic coalition marched to the Blue House, the executive office and residence of the president of South Korea. The Seoul government has considered the U.S.-ROK security alliance vital to the country’s survival, as after the Korean War (1950–1953), Korea was divided into the North (backed by the Soviet Union) and the South. Hence, South Korea often stands by the U.S. During both the Vietnam War (1963–1974) and the Iraq War (2003–2008), the South Korean government backed the U.S. with military deployment. However, after the democratic transition, investigative news reports about South Korean soldiers’ involvement in the massacre of Vietnamese civilians have sparked self-reflection and a peacebuilding movement, 미안해요 베트남 (I am sorry, Vietnam), among the progressive NGO sector. Hence, under public pressure, the South Korean government took a non-combatant role during the Iraq War. Faced with U.S. coercion, South Korean civil society has adamantly opposed the country’s military involvement in the Middle East, launching numerous protests and peace campaigns since April. Now, despite the military threat coming from North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs and the country’s oil supply being heavily affected by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, various polls showed that a slight majority of South Koreans still opposed military deployment to the Middle East. As the Lee administration said that it would seek public consensus over the decision, the anti-war network will continue working to stop the country from being dragged into the Iran war. The next grand mobilization is set for September 12. Written by Oiwan Lam

Online harm is shaping public life as strongly as offline violence Originally published on Global Voices Image by Chad Madden on Unsplash . ( Free to use ). For Kgomotso Modise, a South African journalist covering courts and criminal justice, online harassment has become a daily reality. “The insults are very sexual,” she explains to Global Voices in an interview, noting that her male colleagues expressing similar views never face comparable abuse. Her opinions are routinely sexualized and delegitimized. When she posted content criticizing extrajudicial killings in her country, the backlash escalated into a violation: trolls retrieved childhood photos from her Facebook account and posted them alongside threats of sexual violence against her and her underage niece. But the harm extends far beyond individual journalists. Cybercrime accounts for more than 30 percent of all reported crime in West and East Africa, according to Interpol’s 2025 Africa Cyberthreat Assessment Report . Two-thirds of African member countries surveyed said that cyber-related crimes accounted for a medium-to-high share of all crimes, with online scams, ransomware, business email compromise, and digital sextortion among the most reported threats. Digital threats now reach ordinary users, public institutions, and essential services, creating conditions where intimidation and harmful content can spread easily. Across Africa, Reporters Without Borders has documented sustained online harassment and surveillance targeting women journalists in Africa, noting that digital abuse has become an emerging barrier to press freedom. This year’s 16 Days of Activism (November 25 to December 10) against gender-based violence (GBV) comes at a time when online harm is shaping public life as much as offline violence. Women who comment on public issues, work in journalism, or engage in civic life face increasing hostility that limits their participation. Technology-facilitated violence as part of GBV When I launched the Digital Dada podcast , I wanted to create a space where women journalists could speak openly about their experiences. What I discovered through interviewing dozens of colleagues is that online violence has become one of the fastest-growing forms of gender-based harm in Kenya and across Africa. It manifests as threats, cyberstalking, impersonation, intrusive monitoring, and manipulated content designed to shame or silence women. Every single journalist I’ve interviewed has faced online abuse. The attacks range from targeted harassment and cyberbullying to coordinated trolling campaigns and deeply gendered assaults. Their visibility as women in the media makes them especially vulnerable, turning their online presence into a frequent site for hostility and misogyny. The escalation is terrifying. UN Women warns that what starts small on screens, a message, a comment, or a post, can spiral into a torrent of threats and violence in real life. Private photos are taken without consent, false claims spread within seconds, locations are tracked, and artificial intelligence tools are used to produce deepfakes aimed at shaming and silencing women. I've documented the toll. A television news anchor shared that she began to self-censor because of the fear of continued victimization. Another disclosed that she sought therapy following extreme trolling. Another reported that attacks escalated beyond her, extending to her husband and children. Several journalists have made the difficult decision to deactivate their social media accounts entirely to safeguard their mental well-being. When journalists self-censor, society loses. Freedom of information is jeopardized. These are not isolated incidents; they are systematic attacks designed to push women out of public discourse. Voices from the Luanda summit Digital safety featured prominently at the recent African Union-European Union Summit in Luanda, Zambia. In an interview during the meeting, Ambassador Liberata Mulamula , special envoy to the chairperson of the African Union Commission on Women, Peace and Security, described digital violence as a new threat to peace and security and noted that online spaces can be especially harsh for women in leadership. She spoke openly about the emotional strain caused by persistent abuse, and encouraged women to remain visible online. She stated, “We have mobilised women to use the media and not fear it, because our voices must be heard.” She added that the African Union has created a network of women media professionals to counter misinformation and support survivors of online harm. She also pointed to the African Union’s adoption of its first convention on ending violence against women and girls. She said that implementation must place cybersecurity at the centre and noted that the African Union Women, Peace and Security Forum in Tunisia, which was held on Dec 9 and 10, would address digital violence directly. Ambassador Henriette Geiger , ambassador of the European Union to Kenya and permanent representative to UNEP and UN-Habitat, highlighted the need for stronger cybersecurity capacity as countries digitize essential services. She said the European Union and Kenya are engaged in a data adequacy dialogue to align Kenya’s data protection standards with those of the EU. If successful, she added, Kenya could become a trusted digital hub capable of processing sensitive data securely. Together, the remarks showed a shared recognition that safer digital spaces are essential for women’s participation, equality, and the future of digital cooperation between Africa and Europe. Why the crisis is growing and what must change The rapid expansion of internet access has increased exposure to harmful content. Interpol warns that online threats now target ordinary users and public institutions, making harmful narratives difficult to control. Local reporting shows similar trends. A recent report in Kenya found that many Kenyan women have withdrawn from digital platforms after experiencing harassment linked to political and social discussions. Survivors described feeling unsafe even offline, noting that digital abuse often follows them into their homes. Women seeking political office face the same pressures. A briefing by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy found that candidates face impersonation, doxxing, cyberstalking, and image manipulation intended to discourage them from entering public life. Weak reporting systems and inconsistent policy enforcement add to the problem. Although Kenya has data protection and cybercrime laws , many survivors do not receive timely support, and this is the norm in most African countries. Platforms often remove harmful content slowly, and clear reporting pathways remain limited. These gaps allow online violence to spread even as more services move online. Improving cybersafety requires stronger support services, better platform responses, and clearer mechanisms for reporting incidents. Digital literacy programmes can help users understand safer practices, particularly in rural and low-income communities. Platforms must strengthen their tools for identifying abuse and responding more effectively. Policy frameworks in most African nations provide foundations, but consistent enforcement and adequate resources are needed. Regional cooperation can also support better cybersecurity standards and shared knowledge of emerging threats. This year’s 16 Days of Activism highlighted the need to recognise digital violence as real violence, and remind the public that there is #NoExcuse for online abuse. Written by Cecilia Maundu

Africa could be the world’s next major distribution hub and consumer base for electric vehicles Originally published on Global Voices A road in Casablanca, Morocco. Morocco could play a leading role in Africa’s electric vehicle transition. Image from Wikimedia Commons . License CC BY 3.0 . This article was submitted as part of the Global Voices Climate Justice fellowship, which pairs journalists from Sinophone and Global Majority countries to investigate the effects of Chinese development projects abroad. Find more stories here . Over the last decade, Chinese automakers like BYD, Xpeng, Chery, Wuling, and others have expanded aggressively into the United States and Europe , partly because oversaturation in the domestic market and ongoing price war have made it challenging for automakers to stay profitable. In light of this, Beijing has encouraged Chinese enterprises to go abroad and enter overseas markets through innovation and attractively low prices — especially through green products such as electric vehicles (EVs). However, these markets may no longer be ideal for Chinese automakers looking for foreign buyers. In September 2024, then-US President Joe Biden imposed 100 percent tariffs on Chinese EVs , with current President Donald Trump bumping this to 154 percent in June 2025 . Meanwhile, the European Union has launched investigations into whether Beijing’s national strategy has driven the industry to utilize unfair subsidies. From Washington to Brussels, Chinese automakers face accusations of dumping EVs at unfair prices and damaging the global market. The EU implemented trade barriers in October 2024 to combat this . Facing strong resistance in established automotive markets, many Chinese EV companies are turning to the Global South and shifting their market strategy toward low- and middle-income countries. Africa as the next EV frontier In the new global trade landscape, Africa is no longer just a source of raw materials such as cobalt, lithium, and rare earths — the coveted minerals that feed global battery production. It is an attractive consumer market for automakers looking for new customers and is emerging as a site for production and assembly in China’s electric vehicle supply chain. Read more: Is China responsible for the illegal extraction of mineral resources by its companies in Africa? China's leading automobile maker , BYD, has announced plans to nearly triple its dealership network in South Africa by 2026. Analysts called this a swift move to consolidate market share while competitors hesitate . Another Chinese automobile giant, Chery, is also expanding rapidly across South Africa and Kenya, targeting middle-class buyers with relatively affordable models. According to RFI , Chery South Africa CEO Tony Liu said: 南非是通往非洲大陆的重要门户。南非有非常成熟的汽车金融体系，也有成熟的消费者，他们对售后服务有很高的期望。因此，我们实际上认为南非对我们来说是一个非常具有战略意义的国家和市场。 South Africa is an important gateway to the African continent. South Africa has a very mature auto finance system and also mature consumers who have high expectations for after-sales service. Therefore, we actually consider South Africa to be a very strategic country and market for us. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa tours the Headquarters of BYD and Huawei in Guangdong Province during a visit to China in September 2024 and poses with a BYD model car. Image from South Africa’s GovernmentZA official Flickr account. CC BY-ND 2.0 To facilitate continental battery production, Chinese company Gotion High Tech is building Africa’s first EV gigafactory in Kenitra, Morocco. Moroccan authorities celebrated this project as a positive development that could help the country pivot from industries focused on raw extraction to higher-value production . The government press release read : Cet investissement stratégique majeur, qui porte sur la réalisation d'un écosystème industriel complet de fabrication de batteries électriques à Kenitra, est non seulement la première « gigafactory » qui sera réalisée au Maroc, mais également la première du genre de toute la région Middle East & Africa, consolidant ainsi la position de leader régional du Royaume dans l’industrie automobile et la transition énergétique. This major strategic investment, which involves the creation of a complete industrial ecosystem for the manufacturing of electric batteries in Kenitra, is not only the first ‘gigafactory’ to be built in Morocco, but also the first of its kind in the entire Middle East and Africa region, thus consolidating the Kingdom’s position as a regional leader in the automotive industry and the energy transition. The Gotion High Tech gigafactory is set to open in June 2026, and its location could make it a significant export base for European and African markets. In countries that have traditionally enjoyed warm relations with China, such as Ghana and Kenya, Chinese ministries and state-linked associations are busy holding automotive summits with African governments. New investments in assembly plants and charging infrastructure are packaged as part of “ green mobility partnerships .” Together, these moves show a deliberate attempt to weave Africa into China’s global EV map — not just as a supplier, but as a distribution hub and consumer base. Africa’s own EV momentum To understand the depth of this shift, it’s important to note that African states are not merely passive recipients of Chinese capital. Many countries are proactively embracing the EV transition. According to regional analysis from WowAfrica, a Chinese-language news site about investment in Africa, African countries can be sorted into two categories regarding their approach to EVs: First, established auto producers such as South Africa, Morocco, and Egypt see EVs as a natural extension of their automotive sectors. These narratives align well with China’s goal to create a stronghold in the African market. Secondly, there are the automotive newcomers, such as Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda . These countries lack legacy industries but view EVs as a chance to leapfrog into cleaner, high-tech manufacturing. While each government has its own agenda, all are trying to leverage the EV transition and tie it into their national economic development plans. For example, Kenya has become one of Africa’s most dynamic EV hubs, boosted by tax incentives , a rapid deployment of charging stations, and governmental support in integrating EV development into the national energy strategy. The capital city, Nairobi, has launched a fleet of electric buses to make its public transportation system greener. An electric bus charging in Nairobi, Kenya. Screenshot from YouTube video . Fair use. A star startup company, Roam Motors in Kenya, has secured financing from the US government’s development finance institution (DFC) to scale electric buses and motorcycles , while German development agency GIZ is working with the government to upgrade transport efficiency. Another example is Uganda’s introduction of a National Electric Mobility Policy in 2018. The policy offers favorable exemptions from VAT, import duties, and tax cuts for EVs, batteries, and charging equipment. EV24.Africa, a group promoting EV adoption on the continent, explained the government's long-term plans: “ The government aims to encourage EV adoption despite higher costs, targeting full electrification of public transport by 2030 and passenger vehicles by 2040 .” Meanwhile, Morocco is in an especially unique position on the continent, as a potential gateway into African, European, and US markets. An estimated 80–90 percent of Morocco’s vehicle output is currently exported to Europe, second only to China . The Moroccan government has announced plans to leverage its robust manufacturing network to ensure up to 60 percent of its exported cars are electric by 2030. Moroccan officials have highlighted the country’s position as a free-trade partner with raw-material suppliers and European buyers, making it a logical hub for battery gigafactories. China has strongly welcomed such policies. For years, Morocco has been painted as one of the most essential parts of China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI), its global infrastructure, transportation, and energy connectivity project. The EU’s latest tariff controls on Chinese EVs have made Morocco a highly discussed and enticing new hub for Chinese companies. Global Exhibition, a Shanghai-based group facilitating business expansion into Western Asia and North Africa, explained the strategy behind the shift to Morocco: 对中国而言，摩洛哥不仅是其电动汽车行业离岸外包的重要选择，更是其全球战略棋局中的一枚关键棋子。通过布局摩洛哥，中国不仅能够避开欧美的保护主义政策，继续将产品销往西方市场，还能够进一步拓展其在非洲和全球的影响力。 For China, Morocco is not only an important offshore outsourcing option for its electric vehicle industry but also a strategic pawn in its global game plan. By establishing a strong presence in Morocco, China can sidestep US and European protectionist policies to keep selling into Western markets, while at the same time expanding its influence across Africa and the broader global stage. A large number of Chinese media and state-related research institutes are similarly praising Morocco for its essential role in boosting China’s global EV strategy. But it’s not the only player trying to get into the EV production game. The South African government announced in March 2025 that it would commit ZAR 1 billion (USD 54.27 million) to boost its electric vehicle (EV) production by 2035. This investment aims to transform the country’s automotive industry by focusing on EVs, batteries, and supporting infrastructure. The local government believes “the plan aligns with global sustainability goals and aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions while maintaining South Africa’s position as a leading automotive hub in sub-Saharan Africa.” Based on this momentum, it’s fair to say that Africa is not just being “plugged into” China’s supply chain, but is also trying to set its own terms in the global EV race. A BYD outlet. Screenshot from YouTube . The promise and the trap Chinese state narratives, its companies, and national policymakers all believe China’s EV market integration with Africa is a “win-win” — Africa gets jobs, infrastructure, and rapid clean mobility integration, while China maintains production volumes and global reach. But the reality is more complex. Many analysts have warned that Africa risks being locked into the lower ladder of the EV value chain. Assembly plants and dealerships rarely transition into advanced manufacturing or technology transfer, according to a report by Africa Confidential . Another risk is the uneven benefits. Even Morocco’s gigafactory, though ambitious, is deeply tied to Chinese-controlled networks , raising questions about sovereignty and bargaining power. A long-term risk is the so-called Green Paradox — EVs are undeniably more climate-friendly than gas cars in the long term, but the initial extraction of cobalt, lithium, and rare earths needed to manufacture them often brings environmental and social damage if the mining is unregulated, careless, and exploitative. Without stronger governance, Africa risks replicating old extractive patterns under a “green” banner . The result may be dependency hidden in language of sustainability: Africa as a peripheral supplier and low-cost consumer market in a Chinese-led system. To combat this, green advocates insist that local voices must be heard and included in decision-making processes. If the green transition is to be just and equitable, African people must be included and have an equal stake. Written by Jean Sovon , Vivian Wu